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Glocal Ethiopia: Scales and Power Shifts 
Introduction
Sabine Planel et Marie Bridonneau
With special thanks to René Lefort for his attentive reading and precious comments, which we
integrated into this text. 
1 Never  quite  isolated  from  the  world  but  nonetheless  always  keen  to  control  its
international  relations,  Ethiopia  is  a  recent  convert  to  extraversion:  the country has
engaged  into  in-depth  political,  economic  and  social  reform.  The  lower  scales  are
transforming under the pressure of the global. To respond to the federal government’s
commands,  infra-national  scales  are  attempting  to  seize  long-awaited  development
opportunities. Ethiopia is becoming glocal: the local is coming into direct contact with the
global, sometimes under the incentive of the federal State. 
2 As is the case everywhere else, but even more so within Ethiopia’s complex ethno-federal
structure  (Turton,  2006;  Vaughan,  2003),  scale  relations  reflect  power  relations.  The
powers of globalization are recent and have the potential to deeply reshape politics by
outweighing the national scale. With this special issue, we aim to document and analyse
scale  relations  in  order  to  understand  their  consequences  on  the  transformation  of
Ethiopian  societies,  on  national  economic  growth  and  on  the  evolution  of  political
practices. The articles focus on local analyses, drawing from a detailed understanding of
the  interaction  between local  stakeholders  and  looking  at  global  integration  from a
bottom-up perspective. Our objective is twofold: first of all, to describe the emergence of
a new Ethiopia, transformed by the restructuring of its interaction with the world, which
mostly occurs on a local scale. Secondly, to capture the qualitative aspects of these shifts
in scale and of the redistribution of powers over space, as those changes are having a
deep and lasting impact on the country’s future, regardless of its relations with the rest of
the world. In other words, our purpose is not to draw a detailed picture of all the socio-
spatial transformations currently affecting contemporary Ethiopia, but to deliver a scale-
based  reading  of  these  transformations  in  order  to  understand  them  more
comprehensively.
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3 Our analysis has multiple objectives. First and foremost, this special issue analyses power
along with spatial transformation, in order to understand politics in all its materiality
and historicity. It also questions the role played by the State, which is currently at the
core of all discussions on Ethiopian development. This question is connected to the major
ideological  transition  currently  in  progress  in  Ethiopia,  where  territorial  and  social
equalitarianism are being replaced by more differentiated policies. Finally, this issue is an
invitation to read Ethiopia’s reality through the prism of a very common process of scale
structuration  (i.e.  globalization)  in  an  attempt  to  move  away  from the  paradigm of
cultural exception, often predominant in Ethiopian studies (Tronvoll, Vaughan, 2003).
 
The market economy and its benefits
4 From 1991, the new regime announced political and economical liberalisation (Hagmann,
Abbink, 2011; Lefort, 2012; De Waal, 2013). However in spite of a gradual, sector-by-sector
reorientation of public interventionism, this process was delayed, as illustrated by the
abandonment and reinstatement of price control policies (Vaughan, Gebremichael, 2011).
It was only from the early 00s that the effects of the regime change began to be felt. This
change was caused by several factors. First of all, liberalisation was the product of a truly
original  and innovative  political  vision championed by  former  Prime Minister  Meles
Zenawi, “a truly original thinker” (De Waal, 2013), aimed at answering the needs of the
market economy. It was brought about by the new ratio of power within the Ethiopian
government’s  political  leadership  (Lefort,  2013)  and  by  the  failure  of  previous
development policies, which became apparent with the huge food crisis of 2000/02 or
with the electoral defeat of the ruling party in 2005. Whatever the reason, this highly
publicised « structural change » (Gascon, 2008; Bach, 2011) orchestrated by Meles Zenawi
(2012) acted as a crucial lever for the regime and contributed to its remaining in power. 
5 Ethiopia’s engagement with the market economy only became tangible from the end of
the 00s.  Until  then, the country’s development model had been both autocentric and
endogenic. Its opening to the market economy was then relatively fast, and accelerated
after  the  2005  electoral  defeat.  It  became  associated  with  the  politicians’  –  and  in
particular, the Communist party’s – ambition to regain control of the country. This led to
the 2009 government reform or Business Process Reengineering (Kassahun, 2012), and to
the 2010 launch of a new plan for development, the Growth and Transformation Plan 
(2010/2011 - 2014/2015). The plan implied for the State to take the lead and deliver on the
construction of large-scale infrastructure1 but also on education and healthcare, in order
to foster growth and reduce poverty (FDRE, 2010). While asserting the key leadership role
played by the State in terms of economic growth, the plan also promoted an engagement
with the market which had been inexistent in the country’s past development policies
(also known as pro-poor policies), which focused on poverty, food safety and social welfare2
(Dessalegn Rahmato et al.,  2013).  Food self-sufficiency was  at  the  time seen from an
individual perspective and understood as a product of each farmer’s own capacity:  it
became a national issue that relied upon the capacities of the best food producers, or
model farmers (Lefort, 2012). The Growth and Transformation Plan had two key objectives: to
foster sustainable growth across all of the country’s economic sectors, bringing Ethiopia
up to the level of other emerging countries by 2025, and to ensure the transition from an
economy  based  on  small-scale  farming3 towards  industry  and  service-led  growth
(Meheret Ayenew, 2014). 
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6 Gradually, good governance, anti-corruption measures and the fight against “rent sekers”,
together with metropolisation and urban redevelopment,  are working their  way into
Ethiopia’s  economy,  revolutionising  a  developmental  grammar  directly  derived  from
Marxist-leninist theories (FDRE, 2010; Meles Zenawi, 2012). This renewal didn’t amount to
a  “shock  therapy”:  on  the  contrary  it  was  sequenced,  regionalised  and  sectorised.
Liberalisation mostly translated into a reorganisation of public policies. The State carried
on playing an essential part in planning and in the structuring of the economic fabric
which remained for the most part structured around public or para-public organizations
(Vaughan,  Gebremichael,  2011),  and  it  continued  playing  a  key  part  in  funding  the
country’s economy. Ethiopia has the third highest ratio in the world of public investment
to GDP,  because there is  very limited private investment in the country.  Along with
liberalisation  came  the  creation  of  a  modern  banking  system  designed  to  stimulate
private investment, in particular by facilitating borrowing. It has to be noted that in spite
of  the  rapid  growth  of  private  banks,  State  commercial  banks  remain  predominant
(Admassu Bezabeh et Asayehgn Desta, 2014). Micro-credit has also become institutional
– once again under the public sector’s umbrella – via regional structures such as the ACSI
(Amhara Credit and Saving Institution) that reported over 1.4 million clients in the State-
region of Amhara in 2009 (Siyoum et al., 2012). 
7 This economic reform requires Ethiopia to fully enter the global economy and attract
foreign investors,  while  retaining the support  of  donors  (World Bank,  2013).  Foreign
investment had so far been strictly controlled and restricted to specific sectors such as
horticulture, but globalisation has made it commonplace – with for instance the ex-nihilo
creation of the country’s sugar industry. The Ethiopians of the diaspora benefit from
favourable  investment  conditions  (Chacko,  Gebre,  2012);  calls  for  public  tenders  are
increasingly directed at foreign providers (mostly Chinese and Indian, in the agricultural
sector).  Ethiopia’s  connections  with  the  world  have  improved,  with  Addis  Abeba
becoming a regional airline hub. This ambition also appears in the transformation of city
centres:  business  districts  are  shooting up in the capital,  revealing its  aspirations to
metropolitan status, its role as a showcase for the commercial sector and the new role it
is offering to private investors (Bosredon et al., 2012; Pedrazzini et al., 2014).
8 This economic reorientation is starting to bear its fruits. In 2011/12, per capita income
was reported to be in the region of 513USD and to have significantly increased since the
launch of the GTP. According to the government, growth increased by over 10% per year
in the first two years that followed the implementation of the GTP. These figures were
quoted by international donors (World Bank, 2013) who have since revised them down to
around 6%. In 2010, Meles Zenawi publicly announced a growth rate of 12.5%. The various
indicators produced by national agencies reflect an impressive growth. The percentage of
people living under the poverty line is reported to have gone down from 38.7% in 2003/04
to 29,6% in 2010/11, while gross national savings as a percent of GDP are reported to have
reduced from 5.2% in 2009/10 to 1.8% in just  a  year!  Meheret  Ayenet  does  however
discuss the part played by the GDP in this economic improvement, and points at the
weaknesses of the Ethiopian economy: amongst other issues, problems with balance of
payments deficits due to the structural weakness of exports, although there has been a
clear improvement on this front4;  a deficit in tax collection and a high inflation rate
(34,3 % in 2011/12) preventing most Ethiopians from reaping the benefits of growth. 
9 Similarly, no clear effects have been felt in terms of employment, and the transition from
agricultural labour to urban employment is for now restricted to small sectors of activity,
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in particular flower farms (Yukichi Mano et al., 2011) or even more marginally, tourist
areas  (Bridonneau,  2014a).  The  employability  of  young people  in  general  and young
graduates in particular remains an issue (Broussard et al., 2014). 2 to 2.5 million young
Ethiopians arrive on the job market every year and are unable to find any employment
perspectives, neither in saturated family farming nor in underdeveloped industrial and
service sectors. UNDP estimates urban unemployment at 17.5% of the population while
agriculture remains the main activity for  80% of  Ethiopia’s  population (UNDP,  2014).
Youth  unemployment  and  its  correlation  with  the  perpetuation  of  rural  and  urban
poverty contribute to the development of migration, especially female, to Gulf countries.
Cheap Ethiopian labour is in demand there while on the Ethiopian side, income from
migrants provides a sizeable and essential contribution to economic growth (Fernandez,
2011) 
10 Finally, the real or symbolic effects of this economic transformation trigger and reinforce
social  transformations.  New  categories  of  population  are  appearing,  bringing  new
distinctions into the equalitarian society the country had inherited from the Derg. Urban
middle-classes (Nallet, 2012), new entrepreneurs in cities and rural areas, foreign-trained
experts  (Bridonneau,  2014a),  Pentecostal  evangelists  (Haustein  and  Fantini,  2013)  or
young  urbans  (Di  Nunzio,  2015)  are  all  shaping  up  a  new  Ethiopian  society  and
contributing to its opening up to the world. 
11 However, this reorientation relies on an ambitious challenge: while structuring itself, the
private sector needs to be in a position to take over from public investment (World Bank,
2013).  This  challenge currently  seems compromised by two main factors.  The public
sector’s strong influence on the one hand, and the Ethiopian State’s lack of resources on
the other hand hardly make for an attractive environment. Access to licences, the weight
of bureaucratic red tape and the recent tax reforms are slowing down the development of
the private sector and the penetration of foreign investors. Similarly, the self-funding of
national  development  – through  public  investment  or  recourse  to  “voluntary
contributions”  from  the  Ethiopians  and  civil  servants  in  particular  – appears
compromised by public deficit. 
12 The transformation of the economic model does cause numerous tensions, which appear
in particular in land management. In Ethiopia, power and land ownership have always
been closely linked (Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009; Emmenegger, 2013). Today more than ever,
access to property reflects the public sector’s contradictions – between a need for private
sector intervention and the public sector’s unwavering tendency to keep its grasp on
financial resources. Land management reflects the Ethiopian State’s ability to promote an
endogenous model geared towards the highest possible degree of self-financing. Land
titling reforms and land grabbing policies are indeed the products of a national strategy,
rather than markers of a development agenda dictated by international donors (Lavers,
2012). This new agricultural policy, promoted and managed by the government, detracts
attention from the development of  small-scale  agriculture (Dessalegn Rahmato,  2011;
Lefort, 2011). However, as was the case elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, land grab turned
out to be a failure as only a very small amount of land was eventually handed over to
foreign investors (a few tens of thousands acres so far instead of the planned 3 to 4
millions)  (Dessalegn Rahmato,  2014).  In urban spaces,  and now in peri-urban spaces,
public leases provide a widespread economic reorientation tool. Although the totality of
the land, whether urban or rural, remains State property (and has been since the Derg-led
reforms of 1975), a series of laws on urban leases have created a State-controlled land
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market (Berhanu Adenew, Fayera Abdi, 2005). In peri-urban spaces, the transition from
rural to urban usage and the attribution of land through the leasing system led to the
expropriation of rural populations, essentially for the benefit of urban public housing
programs  and  property  developers  who  are  urbanising  sprawling  urban  margins
(Achamyeleh Gashu Adam, 2014).
13 Ethiopia’s  strong  economic  growth  hides  structural  weaknesses.  The  lack  of  private
investment is  concealed behind significant levels of  public investment that drain the
State’s resources, making the country more dependent than ever on international aid and
diaspora money. Two thirds of the economy, outside of traditional agriculture, are State-
controlled. The political elite’s permanent control over the economy is an obstacle to the
economy’s liberalisation, repelling the very same private investments that the regime is
paradoxically so keen to attract (Lefort, 2013). Save for a few exceptions, the economic
elite is the same as the State Party’s elite. In general, except perhaps for its partnership
with China, Ethiopia’s engagement with international markets is currently characterized
by a great unbalance – both financial and institutional. 
 
A Non-Democratic Developmental State
14 The country’s  economic reorientation follows a  hybrid development model  borrowed
from South-East Asian countries, which has been adapted to Ethiopia’s situation. This
model of the “Developmental State” associates the benefits of the market economy with
strong public sector control (Bayart, 2008; Meheret Ayenew, 2014). It implies that the
development of a market economy, which is seen as a priority, can bring about political
liberalisation (Assefa Fiseha, 2014). Like other more typically liberal models, it is based
upon the link between economic growth and democratisation: a link highlighted by Meles
Zenawi when he defined the “Democratic Developmental State”. Zenawi sees democracy
as  the  masses’  contribution  to  development,  which  makes  him  the  heir  of  the
Revolutionary Democracy of the past (Bach, 2011). However, the model he is promoting is
much more attractive to donors. Although the effectiveness of political liberalisation is
widely debated in academic circles, it is much less so in Ethiopia’s public arena where
political opposition parties are almost inexistent and censorship has been reinforced. In
terms of  political  democratisation,  Ethiopia’s  case  is  highly  ambiguous.  What  we are
witnessing  is  more  akin  to  a  consolidation  of  constraints  than to  a  development  of
democratic practices (Abbink, Hagmann, 2013). This observation is based on a detailed
analysis of local situations rather than on that of government models (although the latter
do  also  reflect  the  regime’s  authoritarianism):  the  near  absence  of  any  political
opponents at  Parliament,  the uninterrupted rule for almost  twenty years of  a  quasi-
unique  party,  the  EPRDF  (Ethiopian  People's  Revolutionary  Democratic  Front),  the
personalization of power in the person of the former Prime Minister, etc.: 
« In the Ethiopian case, the State has narrowed the space for the engagement of
civil society, opposition parties and, to some extent, the private sector, and hence
one may say the autonomy of the state is preserved – albeit under an authoritarian
political order » (Meheret Ayenew, 2014, p.  8).
15 Signs of political openness displayed for the attention of the international community
and Ethiopian civil society including – and particularly – diaspora-led organizations, are
increasingly frequent but they remain tokenistic. This is reflected by the case of regional
decentralisation.  Initiated  in  1991  with  the  creation  of  nine  regional  states,  it  was
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implemented over several stages and resulted in an overhaul of local administrations and
governments, from the wereda through to the kebele5. The latter were consolidated by the
introduction of more qualified management staff, and their remit was extended to cover
new sub-districts (the sub-kebele). Local government is now particularly mixed, with many
institutions stemming from the civil society. The reform has consolidated a very strict
and highly politicized system of  social  control,  enforced through various interlocked
committees  and  cells,  the  most  hybridated  of  which  are  the  “development  groups”
(Lefort, 2010). Similarly, because decentralisation has followed an ethno-federal model
where new administrative structures were based upon ethno-linguistic delineations, this
policy was made harder to implement by the fact that territorialisation, and in particular
the delineation of each administration’s remit, were highly controversial issues (Asnake
Kefale, 2010). Indeed, ethnic belonging is constantly being re-appropriated, rewritten and
reallocated,  in  the  North and particularly  in  the  South of  the  country  (Aalen,  2011;
Osmond,  2014).  Consequently,  although  decentralisation,  and  in  particular  the
consolidation of local administrations, granted the populations better access to public
services (Emmenegger et al., 2011)6, it also contributed to curbing political liberalisation
(Teferi Abate Adem, 2004) – because it created a higher level of de-concentration in public
administrations (for instance when the nomination of a devolved manager, the kebele
manager, brings about increased standardisation and supervision of local government)
but  more  crucially  because  it  reinforced  State/Party  collusion.  In  the former  case,
decentralisation is seen as a conservative force (Planel, 2007), while in the second it is
seen as deceptive (Bjerkli, 2013). 
16  As is the case in other African countries, decentralisation is designed to foster a new style
of public management: in Ethiopia this translates into the promotion of participatory
policies,  and  in  the  civil  society  becoming  more  structured.  Since  the  mid-90s,
participatory  policies  have  created  a  new  relationship  between  the  State  and  their
beneficiaries:  a  relationship  of  an  increasingly  contractual,  individual  and  financial
nature, but one that nonetheless remains more or less authoritarian (Planel, 2014). The
creation  of  new  institutions,  in  particular  local  ones,  combined  with  good  practice-
inspired measures aimed at structuring the civil society, are intended to contribute to a
renewal of  local  politics (Poluah,  2008).  However,  this ambition to structure the civil
society clashes with more typically Ethiopian control methods.
17 From  a  pragmatic  point  of  view,  these  measures  have  had  diverse  consequences  –
although governance practices do not really reflect the intended institutional renewal.
Some authors observed a genuine adaptation of local communities to the new commands
(Lefort, 2012), or even an appropriation of these commands that can lead to the capture
of  power  (Emmenegger  et al.,  2011;  Segers,  2008;  Pausewang,  2002b).  Others  on  the
contrary report the persistence, and even the consolidation, of authoritarian practices,
perpetuating ruling practices or cultural representations that revolve around relations of
domination (Abbink, 2011), especially in the relation between the State and the farming
community (Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009; Lefort, 2010; Aspen, 2002, Pausewang, 2002a). State
supervision of local spaces is so intense that it increases control rather than fostering
development, because of the high political stakes attached to development (Planel, 2014).
18 This phenomenon is mostly due to the confusion between the State and the Party, which
remains  the  main cause  of  political  grabbing.  The ruling party  has  created a  highly
centralized system, with a solid footing in the urban and rural middle classes. It is taking
longer than expected to implement the mutations that started in the early 2000s (when
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the political ratio of power changed in the ruling cabinet), and its legitimacy was widely
challenged at the general election of 2005, whose outcomes were fiercely disputed (Lefort,
2010;  Bach,  2012).  However,  the Party remains powerful  and has  now undertaken to
regain control over its electorate. The Party is trying to recruit more members in order to
remain as close as possible to the people: its membership went from 760,000 in 2005 to 4
million in 2010 (Vaughan, 2011). The evaluation of public policies is increasingly based on
measurable  outcomes  or  “quotas”  (Enten,  2010),  and  civil  servants  are  subjected  to
diverse performance targets (Labzaé, to appear): this means that the State’s achievements
are used indistinctively to serve developmental objectives and to reinforce the Party.
Similarly,  collusions  between  the  State  and  the  Party  are  reinforced  by  the
“Developmental State” model. The emergence of new economic players from the middle
class echoes  changes  in  the  Party’s  membership,  reflecting  an  intimate  connection
between political and economic strategies. The State has thus reinforced its links with the
civil  society  and  its  diverse  players  (investors,  young  people,  women,  farmers  and
cooperatives) in order to encourage them to get involved in the development process. 
19 The intense politicisation of the State’s supervision structures, whether old or new – and
regardless of the electoral agenda – (Assefa Fiseha, 2014) has had multiple effects. The
same corruption and rent-seeking strategies condemned by the government are still seen
as opportunities for local officials to access the State’s resources. Similarly, the expansion
of the interface between the State apparel and local society has increased the number of
political intermediaries, creating so many financial or political opportunities for the local
population (Emmenegger et al, 2011). However, the ambivalence of the processes followed
for the election/designation of local officials (Lefort, 2012; Assefa Fiseha, 2014) is making
it very difficult for the population to access these posts. These various factors contribute
to skewing public development policies and stopping them from reaching their objectives
in a  fair  manner.  Zenebe Uraguchi  (2011)  observes that  the financial  transfers  made
possible by safety net programmes in rural areas (Productive Safety Net Program, or Food-
For-Work programs) are failing to support the development of farming in the medium term
because the funds are mostly used to sustain the farmers through the lean season. Camilla
Louise Bjerkli (2013) also observes that the regional decentralisation of Addis Abeba’s
waste  management  systems  has  created  a  multitude  of  institutions  that  serve  party
politics rather than urban development. Although these hierarchical structures do favour
the reproduction of power, they can also provide young urbans with a space, however
confined, for expression (Di Nunzio, 2014). 
20 These measures are co-produced by hybrid administrations that are widely funded by
foreign donors and development programmes: for this reason, they tend to reflect the
neoliberal tendency to consider development as a purely technical process (Ferguson,
1994)  – and precisely because of  this  apolitical  preconception,  they tend to reinforce
authoritarian practices. This is aggravated by the fact that the collection of international
aid by the various Ethiopian administrations creates complex power relations – which do
not in any way alter the State’s authoritarian government practices (Dereje Feyissa, 2011).
Land registration or titling policies provide a particularly clear example of this distortion
(Chinigo,  2014;  Labzaé,  2014).  They remain top-down policies,  subjected to  the  same
bureaucratic  order  and  “democratic  centralism”  that  presides  over  the  design  and
implementation of public policies. This order reinforces the symbolic distance between
the State and the citizens – a distance that becomes greater, the more the actual physical
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distance is shrinking – and imposes new or reinvented standards on the population. This
contributes to perpetuating the domination of vulnerable populations (Planel, 2014).
21 The reform of the State has created strong tensions. The age-old correlation between
economic  dependency  and  political  domination  has  reinforced  authoritarianism.
Reversely, the availability of new opportunities has allowed for a new elite to emerge.
However,  change  remains  partial  at  best  and  the  general  feeling  is  that  voluntary
servitude might one day turn into a win-win situation. Between the people’s hope for
change and the hardships  of  their  everyday lives,  between authoritarianism and the
market economy, different players are taking advantage of the opportunities arising from
the emergence of multiple scales of action. 
 
Ethiopian glocalisation? 
22 The notion of  scale carries a rich palette of  meaning,  with the potential  to generate
diverse interpretations. Along with the supporters of the theory of scale7, we see it as a
“social  construct” (Brenner,  2001) that reflects the hierarchical  organisation of social
facts  in  space (Collinge,  1999;  Herod,  Wright,  2002).  Scale  can be  seen as  a  dynamic
structuring process that organises a given space into different levels of power (or scale
structuration process) – rather than as an interlocking of different areas of influence.
This conception can help us better grasp the subtlety of scale relations. Furthermore,
analyses  that  factor  in  scale  dynamics  and  structuration  (Brenner,  2001,  2004;
Swyngedouw,  1997)  can  help  us  gain  a  detailed  understanding  of  the  political  and
economic  shifts  that  have  arisen  from  globalisation  and  neoliberal  transformations
(Harvey, 2006; Jessop, 2002). The organisation of global exchanges, the rearrangement of
national spaces and the economy’s globalisation are reworking scale according to new
models,  such  as  glocalisation.  The  glocalisation  phenomenon  involves  a  double
repositioning of space, looking at the two opposite “ends of the scale”8: the global and the
local. It also implies an institutional restructuring from the national to the supranational
and global scales on the one hand, and to the infra-national, regional, metropolitan or
local scales on the other (Swyngedouw, 2004).
23 Considering  space  through  the  prism  of  scale  dynamics  can  help  reveal  the  power
relations that underpin the production of space (Swyngedouw, 1997). As well as being
perfectly  adapted  to  today’s  political  game,  scale  can  also  help  us  grasp  the
demultiplication and circulation of powers, and understand the materiality of politics
(Elden,  2013).  The  de-centering  and  fragmentation  of  the  State’s  powers  are  scale
mechanisms that require us to investigate other types of powers, and in particular other
institutions (Planel, Jaglin, 2014). Scale carries an obvious political dimension. Political
rescaling has  been frequently  used as  a  tool  by  politicians  or  States,  who promoted
neoliberal change by favouring certain scales (local, regional or urban) to the detriment
of  single-scale  national  regulations  (Brenner,  2004),  or  even  by  remapping  electoral
constituencies (Jonas, 1994). This political dimension is exemplified by the manipulation
of scale for politico-administrative purposes, but it is also present in less institutional,
more diffuse forms, whenever the control of space is perceived as a source of power. A
given model of spatial organisation might come into competition with other sources of
legitimacy  but  also  with  other  territorial  processes:  this  potential  for  conflict  and
political debate reflects that carried by scale organisation.
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“This  internal  transformation  of  the  public  sphere  –  where  initiative,  decision-
making and regulation powers are being handed over to the inferior spatial scales,
and  where  complex  combinations  of  interlocked  and  articulated  scales  are
emerging (multi-level governance) – is a major force of spatial reorganisation in
contemporary societies […]. It is however important to stress that the specific type
of  re-calibration  encountered  in  the  public  sphere,  which  has  been  thoroughly
described,  has  not  in  any  way  evicted  the  others  but  has  instead  merged  with
them.” (Planel, Jaglin, 2014, p. 38-39)
24 The  coexistence,  or  hybridisation,  of  diverse  dynamics  in  the  political  sphere  is
particularly acute in authoritarian contexts, where original forms of territoriality and
political rationality prevail – or at least forms that present few similarities with Western
democratic situations, where these shifts in the scales of power were initially designed.
Furthermore, due to this coexistence in a political system such as the Ethiopian ethno-
federation where a hierarchy between powers and standards has become part of  the
institutions, changes have mostly benefitted the economic sector. 
25 Within the vast spectrum of scale shifts,  why did we choose to look at glocalisation?
Certainly  because this  process  provides  an original  perspective on Ethiopia’s  current
transformations. Indeed, the restructuring of scale does not spell the end of the national:
on the  contrary,  it  has  reinforced the  State’s  control  over  the  Ethiopian space.  The
glocalisation phenomenon is therefore a consequence of globalisation. It involves a direct
interaction  between  the  global  and  the  local,  and  an  indirect  relation  with  the
intermediary echelons – the regional level and particularly, in the case of Ethiopia, the
national  level.  This  encounter  between the  two opposite  ends  of  the  scale  does  not
appear, as far as we know, to have an influence on the global echelon. It has however
contributed  to  an  in-depth  transformation  of  local  spaces,  and  has  turned  the  local
alternatively into the grounds of a genuine political negotiation or a simple management
echelon. 
26 The interface between the lower echelons of the State and local societies has recently
gained more importance: this is the result of the Party’s ambition to reinforce its local
foothold,  but  also  a  product  of  glocalisation.  New institutions,  new players  and new
values are emerging in local spaces and revealing – within the boundaries of the State’s
tolerance  – new  political  arenas.  Local  institutions  are  being  consolidated  by  good
governance policies, by aid programs that defend indigenous cultures and know-hows
and champion the ethno-federation project, and by the democratisation process. Local
spaces are now criss-crossed by a network of co-operatives, edir9 and community groups,
as well as popular tribunals, militias, political bureaus and other political cells. Regardless
of the group they belong to, these associations follow very diverse models of organisation
that reflect local differences in organisation and political culture, for instance between
the  centre  and  its  peripheries  (Markakis,  2014).  These  groups  are  either  organised
according  to  a  top-down chain of  command,  where  the  members  are  not  given the
opportunity  to  choose  their  representatives  (and  especially  not  their  President  or
Treasurer, in the case of a cooperative), or according to a more bottom-up model in areas
where cash crops are predominant (Cramer et al., 2014). These models reflect a lack of
political purpose in these scale shifts, which reinforce local political structures without
addressing the confiscation of political power by the upper echelons. 
27 In  Ethiopia,  the  transformations  occurring  at  the  opposite  ends  of  the  scale  are
characterised  by  an  “expansion”  of  the  local  and  by  a  consolidation  of  the  federal
echelon.  The  current  reorganisation  of  the  local scale  in  Ethiopia  is  only  partially
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documented, and this issue aims to supplement this gap. This process follows two main
paths. The reform of the kebele investigated by R. Emmeneger et al. (2011) involves the
development  of  local  institutions,  which  serve  both  a  governmental  function
(development  of  the  kebele council)  and an administrative  one  (nomination of  kebele 
managers as part of the administrative decentralisation process). To which extent did this
reform transform local spaces, and therefore the local scale itself? Scholarship is still
sparse on this question. As a consequence of this institutional promotion (or simply of
this  increased  recognition),  local  issues  have  shifted  up  slightly  towards  the  higher
echelons, somewhere between the village and the municipality – while at the same time,
the infra-communal level (the sub-kebele) was being developed by administrative reforms.
As a consequence, while municipal authorities are increasingly taking control of public
affairs (Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher, 2014), the role of the kebele seems confined to political
surveillance operations (Di Nunzio, 2014) and locked in a form of “scalar imprisonment”
(Planel, 2015).
28 Meanwhile, the federal echelon where the small ruling elite operates has remained intact,
and possibly become stronger.  The symptoms of  this political  grabbing are manifold,
especially in land management (Chinigo, 2014). Contrary to Tom Lavers (2012) we do not
believe that this fact can be explained by the recentralisation of power, as the powers
have never actually been delegated down to the lower echelons and land management
has  always  remained  a  highly  centralised  process  (Crummey,  2000).  Although  the
Constitution  recognises  the  kellel’s  (regional  State’s)  competences  in  terms  of  land
management, the central State’s interference with regional affairs leaves decentralised
government with a  very limited margin of  action.  While  everyday land management
involves every echelon of the Ethiopian administration – including the lowest and most
local ones, which gain a great deal of authority from their monopolistic management of
land tenure – the attribution of concessions remains the privilege of the upper echelons.
The Federal Department of Agriculture selects investors, delineates the plots, negotiates
and signs the contracts, and raises income that should normally be collected (via taxes)
by the regional States (Dessalegn Rahmato, 2011; Labzae, 2014). 
29 The  federal  government  has  officially  taken  over  the  control  of  land  management
through  the  creation  in  2009  of  the  Federal  Land  Bank,  with  an  agency  within  the
Department of Agriculture (AISD10) responsible for its management. The Land Bank is
directly  funded  by  the  regional  States  on  the  basis  of  their  “reserves”,  which  are
determined by an inventory carried out by the Federal Department of Agriculture. These
inventories,  which  look  at  the  amount  of  rural  land  registered,  are  inconsistently
executed depending on the regions. Additionally, land registries are created on a double
level (federal and regional), and regional States sometimes ignore the exact extent and
allocation of their own “land resources”, given that they are mostly responsible for local
registration procedures. The procedure for the verification/validation of land availability
by regional States provides a clear picture of this situation: its role is more to legitimate
the pre-emption of land operated by the federal State in the regions than to deliver a
realistic  assessment  of  land  reserves.  This  short-circuiting  of  scale  means  that  the
regional level is pre-empted by the federal: federal authorities are not just confiscating
the lower echelons’ legal powers but also diverting the tax income that they were meant
to receive, along with the various privileges attached to this type of transactions. 
30 The relation of power arising from the direct confrontation between on the one hand a
small  and powerful  political  elite  and on the other  hand the redesigned local  scales
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usually plays out to the detriment of the local. This centralisation of power contributes
consolidating authoritarianism – all the more that the structuration of the supposedly
more democratic local level conceals a reinforcement of constraints. For instance, the
lower echelons are affected by strong financial pressure from the upper levels. The kellel
do have their say in the management of municipal budgets11 and in local planning, but
the  delivery  of  urban  development  plans,  although  originally  allocated  to  the
municipalities  by  the  Constitution,  is  rarely  conducted  on  a  local  scale:  for  lack  of
sufficient funds,  the local  authorities hand over the delivery to the kellel-level  Urban
Agency. In turn, these regional Urban Agencies themselves often hand over the delivery
of the plans to consultants from independent agencies. Most of these architecture and
urban planning agencies are based in Addis Abeba, and in most do not only operate in the
field  of  consultancy:  they  also  train  professionals  in  the  capital’s  higher  education
institutions,  or hold (or have held)  diverse administrative or political  responsibilities
(Bridonneau, 2014a). This combination of roles facilitates the circulation of these elites
across Ethiopia’s various scales, all the more easily that these consultancies usually have
strong links with the federal scale. The other stakeholders have a more limited ability to
contribute to the federal construction and interact with different levels of power. 
31 However, glocalisation does have a real impact as this contact with the global provides
local players with new resources.  These financial resources,  standards and values are
feeding into new forms of resistance – some of which have become more passive, and
most of which are ineffective (Di Nunzio, 2014).  More frequently,  these resources are
appropriated by new social categories like the urban middle classes, the educated youth,
Pentecostal evangelists, rich farmers and new tourism entrepreneurs. In small heritage
towns, the development of tourism has facilitated intense glocal contact. A new class of
entrepreneurs has harnessed new income streams from tourism, for instance via complex
sponsorship strategies (Bridonneau, 2013). These young entrepreneurs often invest
locally  in  the  hotel  trade,  developing  ambitious  real  estate  strategies,  and  building
partnerships with foreign investors, with whom they usually have personal links. Most of
them have built  their capital  from land grabbing and real  estate development.  Their
economic power and the limited networks they can draw upon are insufficient for most of
them to develop activities outside of the tourist sector. However, due to their relation
with  the  global,  these  players  are  discovering  and incorporating  new standards  and
values. Although some of them openly build links with the Party in order to contribute to
the country’s  “development” but  also  to  gain better  access  to  State  resources,  these
players are also expressing their dissatisfaction with the local authorities’ weaknesses. In
Lalibela, where entrepreneurs have entered a conflict with the Church administration,
they tend to turn to the upper echelons (regional and federal) to get their voices heard
and seek mediation. It appears that the upper echelons, often led by admired political
personalities,  are  more  frequently  seen  as  an  incarnation  of  the  State  than  local
administrations, perceived as weak and incompetent12. 
32 The recent analysis of resettlement programmes reaches the same conclusions. Since the
first  half  of  the  20th century,  displacing  and  resettling  populations  has  been  a  key
instrument  of  territorial  planning  and control  (Pankhurst,  1992;  Dessalegn Rahmato,
2003;  Pankurst,  Piguet,  2009).  This  practice  has  been  transformed  by  the  growing
intervention of  non-State  stakeholders,  in  both rural  and urban areas  (Labzaé,  2014;
Bridonneau,  2014b).  When international  donors,  bilateral  cooperation stakeholders or
NGOs are involved in population displacement programmes, they create constraints that
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curb the State’s power – for instance, by tying aid payment to the State meeting certain
standards and rules set out in international operational manuals (World Bank, 2001). By
complicating relations  of  power,  these  programmes can punctually  and momentarily
disrupt the exercise of power by providing the citizens with a margin for negotiation, or
even for protest. However, the donors’ interventions are usually channelled through ad
hoc administrations created under the authority of  the Federal  government.  Built  on
purpose for  the delivery  of  the  projects  to  facilitate  good  governance,  these
administrations create committees of civil society representatives and organise public
consultation meetings to stimulate local democracy. Consequently, although the collusion
between the experts from hybrid administrations and the local authorities remains very
strong, the latter remain the populations’ main point of contact. The decision-making
lines are moving to reaffirm the power of the federal echelon, which remains the donors’
main interlocutor. 
 
Scale as a “deciphering method”13
33  These concrete situations reflect the interest of scale as a method through which to
understand the changes undergone by Ethiopia, and as a tool through which to decipher
political and social transformation. The structuration of scale can help us analyse local
case studies as examples of the rearrangement of power and power relations. The
contributions compiled in this issue all  question the notion of a “glocal  Ethiopia” by
rooting  their  analyses  in  specific  local  spaces  and/or  objects  that  reflect  the
developmental  transition  –  taking  in  its  background,  its  suddenness,  its  regional
differentiation  and  its  stakeholders,  as  well  as  its  political,  economic  and  social
dimensions. 
34 This issue gives pride of place to young researchers (five out of seven contributions have
been written by researchers whose PhD theses are either in development or have been
defended  between  2009  and  2014).  The  contribution  brought  by  European  research
projects (Chinigo and Fantini, Nyssen et al.) is all the more essential that most scholarship
on  contemporary  Ethiopia  currently  comes  from  international  –  and  in  particular,
English-speaking  –  academic  circles.  In  order  to  meet  the  demands  of  a  scale-based
approach,  this  issue necessarily  cuts  across  disciplines.  Political  scientists,  historians,
geographers and environment scientists are bringing a diverse outlook on the changes
undergone by Ethiopia: some by focussing on a local (Chiningo and Fantini; Lefort) or a
regional approach (Pinauldt); others by analysing scale structuration processes through
religious  phenomena  (Bach),  heritage  (Josse-Durand;  Blanc  et  Bridonneau)  or  the
environment (Nyssen et al). This issue features articles that are for the most part based on
ethnographic  fieldwork  projects  spanning  over  diverse  periods  of  time,  that  pay  a
particular attention to the markers of change in local spaces. All share a concern with
developing an in-depth understanding of change and putting it  into perspective with
earlier, more or less remote periods. Years or even decades of fieldwork have allowed the
authors  to  gain  a  very  precise  understanding  of  the  socio-political  and  economical
mutations at work in Ethiopia’s local spaces, as illustrated by René Lefort’s article. This
issue also documents a great diversity of regional situations: from Ethiopia’s historical
centres of power to the Amhara and Tigray highlands in the North (Lefort, Nyssen et al.,
Blanc and Bridonneau), the Somali border (Pinauldt) or further South, the Omoro region
(Chinogo and Fantini) and the Konso territory (Josse-Durand).
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35 These  different  viewpoints  and  areas  of  focus  depict  Ethiopia  in  the  midst  of  a
reorganisation process. Starting from a case study located in the Oromia region, Davide
Chinigo and Emanuele Fantini show very clearly how a “Thermidorian situation” can
translate  into  a  very  original  situation  in  Ethiopia.  The  authors  analyse  agrarian
modernisation  reforms  (and  in  particular  the  transformation  of  structures  such  as
cooperatives,  micro-credit  institutions  or  small  businesses)  in  the  West  Arsi  area  to
illustrate  the  combination  of  economic  liberalisation  and  State  reinforcement  in
contemporary Ethiopia.
36 Concerning Ethiopia’s northern mountains, Jan Nyssen et al. present a synthetic analysis
of  the  endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  of  environmental  change  in  Ethiopia,  in
particular in terms of soil condition. They deliver an assessment of the evolution of soil
management and in particular conservation policies, which have increased agricultural
production without reducing poverty. Always in the North, but with a much more social
reading of  scale repositioning, René Lefort presents a critical  perspective on the fast
development of cash crops. Lefort highlights the social reorganisation associated with
this development in a village of the Amhara region. By articulating his presentation of the
new cash crops with that of new figures that have emerged in local society, his article
illustrates  society’s  fast  structuration  into  social  classes  and  questions  the  potential
political consequences brought along by this process. 
37 In the Somali region, Géraldine Pinauldt shows how the federal echelon has taken control
of health and environment standards, placing constraints on exports (towards the Gulf
countries) in an attempt to assert its power over export resources such as Somali cattle,
which had long escaped its control. The author shows the obstacles encountered by this
attempt, and how it resulting in relations of power becoming more complex rather than
increasing the federal State’s control over this resource. Jean-Nicolas Bach demonstrates
how global and contemporary debates on Islam, and in particular radical Islam, are being
instrumentalized by the State in an attempt to keep Ethiopian Muslims in check and
control resistance and protest. In doing this, Bach reminds us that religion can act as a
powerful scale structuring factor in some societies.
38 Two articles look at heritage, in the North’s traditional natural and cultural heritage sites,
and in the South’s new “cultural landscape” (Guillaume Blanc and Marie Bridonneau,
Chloé  Josse-Durand).  In  the  northern  sites,  Guillaume  Blanc  and  Marie  Bridonneau
remind us how glocal contact has long happened at the detriment of the local, which has
been crushed by top-down institutions. On the Konso territory, Chloé Josse-Durand shows
how the State has seized an opportunity to redefine global heritage in order to support its
stances on ethnic federalism. Both contributions tend to highlight how heritage has been
supporting and reinforcing the reorganisation of politics caused by globalisation. 
39 Considered together, the articles in this issue shed a new light on shifts in scale. They
highlight the emergence of new political arenas and the renegotiation of local powers.
From a social perspective, they show the emergence of new figures – in particular, those
of entrepreneurs with a foothold in local and regional spaces (Pinauldt),  brokers and
consultants (Josse-Durand, Blanc and Bridonneau) or rich farmers (Lefort), revealing an
increased  stretch  and  differentiation  of  social  groups.  All  contributions  depict  an
increasingly structured interface between Ethiopia and the world, generating both money
making and social climbing opportunities, and a toughening of the State’s authoritarian
power (Chinigo and Fantini), counterbalanced in some cases by other anti-centric powers,
in particular in the eastern margins (Pinauldt). The regime is however concerned that
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some groups might be marginalised by the effects of “Glocal Ethiopia” – whether those
are new proletarians (Lefort) or antagonistic religious groups (Bach). New players, new
values and new references are thus structuring local spaces, all the while contributing to
a diversification of the social body which promises to bring about a new wave of equally
radical change. 
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NOTES
1. For instance, roads, hydro-electric dams but also large-scale sugar industry. 
2. SDPRP (Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program), finalised in 2002; PASDEP
(Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty), 2005/2006-2010/2011.
3. ADLI programme (Agricultural-Development Led Industrialisation).
4. Laquelle devrait être palliée par l’exportation de biens industriels mais plus certainement par
les productions agricoles cultivées sur les terres du land grab.
5. A lower echelon of the Ethiopian administration, the wereda is the equivalent of a district and
the kebele that of a town.
6. See Rony Emmenegger’s analyses on the « reformed kebele ».
7. See Planel, Jaglin, 2014; Herod, Wright, 2002.
8. To quote Michel Foucault’s extremely relevant terms (2004).
9. A mutual help association designed to mutualise the cost of social events and ceremonies. 
10. Agricultural Investment Support Directorate.
11. Field observations, Planel S., Wolayta, February 2015.
12. Field observations, Bridonneau M., Lalibela, août 2014.
13. Foucault  (2004,  p. 192).  The  expression  in  this  text  doesn’t  strictly  refer  to  scale,  but
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